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WHERE DOES THE BREXIT DEBATE STAND IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM RIGHT NOW? 
 
Presentation to the European Affairs Committee  
of the Danish Parliament 
 
14th October 2016 
 
 
On the 11th October 2016 the opposition Labour Party presented the ruling Conservative 
UK government with a list of 170 questions – one for each day before Theresa May’s self-
imposed deadline to start the process of leaving the EU.1 A more realistic list of questions 
in the UK’s ‘Brexit’ debate right now would consist of 17 000 questions – the four decade-
old UK-EU relationship raises so many questions that it would take that many days (46 
years) to address them. 
 
This briefing will focus on three factors in the UK right now – referendum context, UK gov-
ernment, and Brexit debate – with a specific focus on just seven questions in the Brexit 
debate: legal, political, social, economic, conflict, and environmental questions. 
 
The briefing argues that the UK referendum has unsettled Britain for a generation to come. 
The unconvincing referendum context, the UK government omnishambles, and the unan-
swerable questions of the divisive Brexit debates all create a very uncertain future which 
further threatens the cohesion of the UK. 
 
Prior to 2016 the question of ‘Europe’ – the UK’s membership of the EU - was long con-
sidered a ‘second order’ issue of no real political interest to voters and politicians alike. 
The divisive campaign, referendum, and resulting political chaos have created a new, first-
order rupture at the heart of British society and politics. 
                                                 
1
 Emily Thornberry and Keir Starmer, Labour’s 170 questions for the Tories on Brexit, 11
th
 October 2016. 
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[1] Unconvincing Referendum Context 
 
In January 2013 Prime Minister David Cameron promised a referendum on UK member-
ship of the EU in order to deal with divisions within his Conservative party. The consulta-
tive referendum was held on the 23rd June 2016; the result was non-binding.2 The result 
was unconvincing for three reasons - UK voters knew very little about their membership of 
the EU; the result was indecisively close; and subsequent government policy is unknown. 
 
(i) Referendum Result 
 
2015 UK Population (ONS mid-2015 estimate)3 -  65 110 000  [100%] 
Underage (ONS figure) -    13 712 396 [  21%] 
Ineligible (own estimate based on ONS figure) -      4 896 363 [    8%] 
 
Abstained -     12 949 258 [  20%] 
Voted Remain -     16 141 241 [  25%] 
Voted Leave -     17 410 742 [  27%] 
 
Voting (51% of population):  
Voted Remain -    16 141 241 [  48% of voters] 
Voted Leave -    17 410 742 [  52% of voters] 
 
As the referendum results demonstrate, the outcome was indecisively close – in most vot-
ing areas a majority of the people (more than 50% of the eligible electorate) did not vote 
for either Remain or Leave, as the map below shows.4 Subsequent opinion polls show the 
indecisiveness of the result, with the most recent British Election Survey suggesting a 5-
10% swing to Remain.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Elise Uberoi, European Union Referendum Bill 2015-16, House of Common Library, Briefing Paper Number 
07212, 3
rd
 June 2015. 
3
 UK population mid-year estimate 2015, Office for National Statistics.  
4
 Bob Taylor, 'Brexit - a story in maps', 10
th
 August 2016.  
5
 British Election Survey, ‘Brexit Britain: British Election Study Insights from the post-EU Referendum wave of 
the BES internet panel’, 6
th
 October 2016. 
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UK Referendum Result by Voting Area: Remain, Neither, Leave  
(majority of eligible electorate) 
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(ii) Meaningless Referendum 
 
Despite David Cameron’s overconfidence, the referendum is considered meaningless for 
three reasons: electoral system, biased news media, and BBC bias. In addition, two new 
factors become important: social media and campaign dishonesty. 
 
The UK first-past-the-post electoral system generally produces majorities within the 
House of Commons, but there has been no government since 1935 that has been elected 
with a majority of votes. This means that the referendum (similar to European Parliament 
elections) became a plebiscite on the popularity of David Cameron and the government. 
 
The UK newspaper industry is over 80% owned by just 4 billionaires/corporations: Ru-
pert Murdoch’s News Corp (The Times, The Sunday Times, The Sun); Jonathan Harms-
worth’s  Daily Mail and General Trust (Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday, Metro); the Mirror 
Group (Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror), and Richard Desmond’s Express Newspapers (Daily 
Express, Sunday Express, Daily Star).6 Five of the six of the most circulated daily news-
papers (Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, and Daily Star) supported the 
Leave campaign. Content analysis of articles focused on the referendum found 41% were 
pro Leave as against 27% pro Remain, marking a dominant pro Brexit bias, where six out 
of nine newspapers had a dominance of pro-Leave articles.7 The UK television industry is 
dominated by Rupert Murdoch’s Sky with annual revenues of £8bn, compared with the 
BBC’s annual revenues of £5bn.  
 
The BBC is required to ‘inform, educate and entertain’, but was unable to do so in the ref-
erendum because of its desire to present both sides unquestionably in a policy of ‘regulat-
ed equivocation’.8 BBC bias in covering the EU is well established – focused on British 
political parties, seen through the prism of Westminster, and Eurosceptic (BBC Breadth of 
Opinion Review)9; anti-EU sentiment dominated the news for the whole of June and the 
Leave campaign was quoted more prominently on TV (Media Tenor International)10; and 
that there is little space for independent sources with expert knowledge to verify claims, or 
put statistics in context.11 
 
                                                 
6
 Media Reform Coalition, Who Owns the UK Media? 22
nd
 October 2015. 
7
 David Levy et al, UK Press Coverage of the EU Referendum, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 
7
th
 September 2016. 
8
 Andrew Jack, ‘Brexit Briefing: Balance at the BBC’ Financial Times, 11
th
 August 2016; Catherine Bennett, 
‘The BBC’s fixation on ‘balance’ skews the truth’, The Guardian, 4
th
 September 2016.  
9
 Karin Wahl-Jorgensen et al, BBC Breadth of Opinion Review, Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cul-
tural Studies, 28
th
 June 2013. 
10
 Media Tenor International, Overall negative media frame on EU, 24
th
 June 2016. 
11
 Stephen Cushion et al, Impartiality Review of BBC Reporting of Statistics: A Content Analysis, Cardiff  
School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, January 2016. 
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The hostile UK news media and problems with the public BBC service meant that there 
was no genuine public sphere necessary for the referendum to take place. 
 
Two additional factors during the campaigns ensured that the referendum became mean-
ingless: the emergence of social media as an unregulated campaign ground, and cam-
paign dishonesty on an industrial scale.  
 
The UK referendum demonstrated for the first time that political debate has moved away 
from the old media of radio, newspapers and television to the unregulated ‘wild west’ of 
social media. Research demonstrates that anti-EU campaigners were dominant on social 
media and commenting online on conventional media long before the official Leave cam-
paign began. Social media research on Instagram shows that there were twice as many 
Leave supporters and they were five times as active – comparable research on Facebook 
and Twitter provides similar evidence.12 The online comments of conventional media, in-
cluding both Leave and Remain newspapers, were similar full of anti-EU comments. What 
made the campaign different was the extent to which such new and old media interven-
tions, comments and contributions were overwhelmingly insulting, abusive and inaccurate. 
For the first time systematic ‘trolling’ and disinformation, previously only seen used by the 
Russian Federation, was found in European media debates.  
 
The final unforeseen factor was critical - UK voters know very little about their membership 
of the EU, and were not informed by the campaign debates at all. Comparative research 
has constantly shown that UK voters are amongst the least knowledgeable on EU matters, 
with only 28% of polled UK citizens understanding the very basics about the EU (including 
how many member states there are).13 Unlike other European democracies, where publi-
cally-employed EU researchers are relied on to provide accurate and impartial information, 
there was no meaningful participation by any research-based EU researcher in the refer-
endum campaign. Those EU researchers who did try to inform debate found themselves 
attacked and their publically-funded research dismissed as just ‘opinion’. So bad was this 
complete absence of informed debate and opinion that only one EU researcher’s expertise 
was seen within the public debate - Professor Michael Dougan’s (University of Liverpool) 
14th June video on the Leave campaign’s “dishonesty on an industrial scale”.14  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Daniel Jackson, Einar Thorsen and Dominic Wring (eds.) EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters 
and the Campaign. Early reflections from leading UK academics (Bournemouth University, June 2016). 
13
 Tobias Buck, ‘Britons least informed on EU treaty’, Financial Times, 29
th
 January 2005; European Com-
mission,  Eurobarometer 83, Spring 2015;  IPSOS MORI, ‘The Perils of Perception and the EU: Public mis-
perceptions about the EU and how it affects life in the UK’, 9
th
 June 2016. 
14
 Michael Dougan, ‘Professor Michael Dougan on the EU Referendum’, University of Liverpool, 20
th
 June 
2016. 
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(iii) Explaining the Result 
 
The referendum result table (i) shows that 35% of adult UK residents did not vote, but of 
those that did a referendum day poll suggests that many (44%) had decided which way to 
vote more than a year before the poll.15 This poll also suggests that in addition some vot-
ers (14%) decided their vote before the official campaigns began, while more (25%) decid-
ed during the campaigns. The final group of voters (17%) were unable to decide until the 
last days before the referendum. What this poll suggests is that most of those who voted 
decided how to vote irrespective of the official campaigns, while a greater number were 
largely undecided or chose not to vote at all. This last group clearly reflects the high de-
gree of uncertainty and lack of knowledge over the UK’s membership of the EU.  
 
There are four explanations for the referendum, two of which of which are supported in by 
research-based voting analysis:16 
 
Leave campaign – the strength of the Leave campaign and the activism of right-wing or-
ganisations such as UKIP are widely believed to have determined the result. The neo-
liberal leaders of the Leave campaign (Boris Johnson and Michael Gove) and the UKIP 
party (Nigel Farage) and their wealthy sponsors (Arron Banks, Paul Sykes, and Richard 
Desmond) are all current or former supporters of the Conservative party. While the cam-
paign was successful in the spread of disinformation, distrust and divisive abuse, it was 
not the determining factor in explaining the result. 
  
Anti-EU – anti-EU feelings and opinions were strongly voiced by the Leave campaign and 
were also believed to have determined the result. Important here was the “Let’s take back 
control” slogan of the Leave campaign and its commitment to five goals: 
 Our money – give the NHS millions more every week 
 Our economy – create new jobs with new trade deals 
 Our borders – a new points-based immigration system 
 Our security – depart dangerous foreign criminals 
 Our taxes – cut VAT on household energy bills 
 
All five of these commitments were disproven or discredited during the campaign, and 
were all denied as untrue by the leaders of the Leave campaign immediately after the ref-
                                                 
15
 Michael Ashcroft, ‘How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why’, 24
th
 June 2016. 
16
 Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath (2016), ‘The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggre-
gate-level Analysis of the Result’, Political Quarterly 87(3); Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, Brexit vote 
explained: poverty, low skills, and lack of opportunity, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016; Agust Arnorsson 
and Gylfi Zoega, On the Causes of Brexit, Working Papers in Economics and Finance, 1605, Birkbeck Col-
lege, August 2016; Sascha Becker, Thiemo Fetzer, and Dennis Novy, Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehen-
sive District-Level Analysis, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 305, University of Warwick, Octo-
ber 2016.  
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erendum. Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, and Nigel Farage were subsequently proven to 
have lied about the major claims of their campaign on questions of contributions to the EU 
budget, immigration, the EU’s Single Market, national security, and taxes.17 However, 
while anti-EU opinions were strongly voiced during the referendum campaign, they were 
not a primary determining factor in explaining the result. 
 
Immigration – anti-immigration views and xenophobia became the major focus of the 
Leave campaign once it was realised there was no economic case for leaving the EU. The 
Leave campaign placed considerable emphasis on controlling ‘our borders’ by introducing 
a new points-based immigration system, although this was claim was subsequently denied 
by leaders of the Leave campaign. Nigel Farage and UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster and 
campaign was specifically identified by the UN, Council of Europe, and human rights 
groups as invoking racism and xenophobia to win the referendum.18 Research-based 
analyses of voting found that “those places which experienced an increase in EU migration 
over the last ten years tended to be somewhat more likely to vote Leave”.19 Immigration 
was an important issue in areas that had experienced sudden population change since the 
2004 enlargement of the EU, but this was a secondary factor shaped by the primary de-
termining factor – inequality. 
 
Inequality – questions of poverty, unemployment, poor education, disadvantage, and ine-
quality played no real role in the referendum campaigns, but they determined the outcome. 
All research-based voting analyses demonstrate that those groups most vulnerable to 
poverty and austerity, with lower education, lower income, and older age groups, were 
more likely to vote Leave.20 Goodwin and Heath found that support for Leave was 30% 
higher amongst those with lower education; 20% higher amongst those over 65 years old; 
10% higher amongst those earning less than £20 000 (DK 165 000) per year; and 18% 
lower amongst people with non-white ethnic backgrounds. But they also found that the 
most important factor was location – people living in marginalised and disadvantaged 
places, ‘left behind’ by globalisation and de-industrialisation, and hit hard by the previous 
six years of neo-liberal austerity, were far more likely to vote Leave. 
 
                                                 
17
 BBC News, ‘Reality Check: Have Leave campaigners changed their tune?’, 28
th
 June 2016; The Editorial 
Board, ‘Brexit Proponents’ False Promises Crumble’, The New York Times, 28
th
 June 2016; Bethan 
McKernan, ‘8 of the most misleading promises of the Vote Leave campaign, ranked in order of preposter-
ousness’, The Independent, 24
th
 June 2016. 
18
 Agence France-Presse, ‘Reported Hate Crimes Surged Around Brexit Vote: UK Police’, NDTV, 9
th
 July 
2016; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding observations on 
the twenty-first to twenty-third periodic reports of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, 26
th
 
August 2016; Benjamin Ward, ‘Britain’s Brexit Hate Crime Problem: UN Report Slams “Divisive” and “Xeno-
phobic” Brexit Campaign’, Human Rights Watch, 5
th
 September 2016. 
19
 Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath (2016), ‘The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggre-
gate-level Analysis of the Result’, Political Quarterly 87(3), p. 329. 
20
 Goodwin and Heath (2016), p. 325; Goodwin and Heath, Brexit vote explained (2016), p.1; Arnorsson and 
Zoega (2016), p. 26; Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2016), p. 16. 
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[2] UK Government Omnishambles 
 
The aftermath of the consultative referendum resulted in the immediate resignation of the 
British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and summer-long government chaos as the Con-
servative party struggled to find a replacement for him. This UK government omni-
shambles (‘disastrous consequences of political ambition’) has continued after Theresa 
May out-maneuvered Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, and Andrea Leadsome to become 
Prime Minister on 13th July 2016.21 There are three factors that drive the continued omni-
shambles: party politics, government cabinet, and political agenda. 
 
(i) Party Politics 
 
The political consequences of the referendum result are primarily shaped by the party poli-
tics of the Conservative party, not by the result or by British national interest. Prior to the 
referendum, the Conservative party was the only major UK party where a significant num-
ber of Members of Parliament had declared support for Leave – 138 MPs supported 
Leave, while 185 supported Remain.22 Exit polling of referendum voters suggests that 
supporters of all major UK parties voted in favour of Remain, with the exception of the 
Conservatives - votes for Remain – Greens 75%; Liberal Democrats 70%; Scottish Na-
tionalists 64%; Labour 63%; Conservatives 42%. The debate over the referendum result is 
politically seen as a Conservative party problem, with opposition parties primarily critical of 
the divided Conservative government and its proposed legislative agenda. 
 
(ii) Cabinet Politics 
 
The UK government’s cabinet of ministers consists of 7 pro-Leave ministers and 15 pro-
Remain ministers, plus Theresa May. Astonishingly three of the ministerial positions deal-
ing with the UK’s relationship with the EU have been given to pro-Leave supporters. Boris 
Johnson, who was pro-EU but chose the lead the Leave campaign for personal political 
gain, was appointed foreign secretary. David Davies, a former minister for Europe, pro-
Leave and lacking in knowledge regarding the EU and UK trade, was appointed ‘Exiting 
the EU’ secretary. Liam Fox, the disgraced former Defence minister was also pro-Leave 
and lacks knowledge on questions of trade, but was appointed international trade secre-
tary. These three ministers, together with three other pro-Leave ministers, make up half of 
the ‘European Union Exit and Trade Committee’ in charge of negotiations with the EU. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Henry Farrell, ‘Forget ‘House of Cards.’ Watch ‘The Thick of It’ if you want to understand Britain’s omni-
shambles’, The Washington Post, 1
st
 July 2016. 
22
 BBC News, ‘Where the cabinet and other MPs stand’, 22
nd
 June 2016. 
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(iii) Political Agenda 
 
The UK government’s initial political agenda under Prime Minister Theresa May gives 
some indication of UK politics during the 3½ years until the next general election sched-
uled for the 7th May 2020. At the October Conservative party conference, Theresa May 
announced that the UK government would initiate the EU Article 50 procedure at the end 
of March 2017, and that it would introduce a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ in May 2017 which would 
propose legislation to transpose all EU-related law into UK law on the day the UK leaves 
the EU. While initially seen as bringing clarity to the post-referendum chaos in the UK, both 
these initiatives are highly problematic for diplomatic and constitutional reasons. Diplomat-
ically it is widely accepted that the UK cannot conclude any acceptable post-EU economic 
relations within the two years from April 2017 to April 2019. The combination of the French 
Presidential elections (April-May 2017), the German federal election (August-October 
2017), and the European Parliament elections (May 2019) means there is not enough time 
for negotiating acceptable post-EU relations before the UK departs. In addition, Theresa 
May has stated her preference for controlling immigration from the EU over access to the 
Single Market, as well as her support for negotiating a customs union with the EU. 
 
What is absolutely clear from the UK government omnishambles is that neither the Prime 
Minister nor her EU-related ministers have the experience or the competence to negotiate 
the best outcome for Britain – any deal will be for the benefit of the Conservative party ra-
ther the UK as a whole. 
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[3] Divisive Brexit debates 
 
The current Brexit debates in the UK are divisive in that they set local communities, ethnic 
groups, and regions against each other. The debates reflect the patterns of disadvantage 
and deep divisions which now clearly distinguish educational opportunity, family income, 
generational differences, and the post-industrial landscape of the UK. Finally, the debate 
demonstrates that the processes of the disunited kingdom are accelerating – the 2011 UK 
Census indicates that British identity is being swept away by home country national identi-
ty.23 Of these divisive, dividing, disuniting Brexit debates, legal, political, social, economic, 
conflict, and environmental questions are currently important. 
 
(i) Legal Questions 
 
In the UK’s relationship with the EU, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales has 
found that “the most fundamental rule of UK constitutional law is that the Crown in Parlia-
ment is sovereign and that legislation enacted by the Crown with the consent of both 
Houses of Parliament is supreme.”24 The UK has a 300-year old practice of parliamentary 
sovereignty on this basis, where parliament may decide which laws to accept and which 
laws to reject. The UK has been a party to 14,000 treaties over the past 200 years, includ-
ing the European Communities Act 1972, all of which involve the sharing of sovereignty, 
but are all subject to parliamentary supremacy. 
 
The UK government’s pursuit of leaving the EU raises many significant legal and constitu-
tional questions. First, the UK membership of the EU was based on four decades of dem-
ocratic debate and parliamentary law-making on questions of the benefits and conse-
quences of EU membership. Regardless of the High Court and Supreme Court rulings, de-
termining the long-term consequences of the UK’s relationship with the EU through short-
term tools such as a referendum, the use of royal prerogative, or a single act of parliamen-
tary approval has serious consequences for UK democracy that cannot be easily reme-
died. Second, the UK government’s decision to leave the EU radically alters the current 
constitutional settlement regarding the home countries and national assemblies of Scot-
land, Northern Ireland, and Wales. Finally, it is inevitable that the moment the UK leaves 
the EU in May 2019 and enacts the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, if it wishes to retain access to EU 
markets, it will need to copy the daily legislative activity of the EU into UK legislation. All 
three of these aspects move democracy and the law making away from UK parliamentary 
sovereignty and towards executive and bureaucratic rule by the government. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Elise Uberoi, ‘Brexit: national identity and ethnicity in the referendum’, Second Reading: the House of 
Commons Library blog, 14
th
 July 2016. 
24
 R (Miller) -V- Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 3
rd
 November 2016. 
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(ii) Political Questions 
 
The referendum and UK government policy of leave raises significant political questions 
about democracy in the UK. First, as discussed, it is clear that the UK does not have a 
genuine public sphere capable of sustaining adequate public debate necessary for democ-
racy to function. Reforms to laws governing campaign behaviour and a strengthening of 
the role of the Electoral Commission may help, but the referendum debates were primarily 
conditioned by a generation of ignorance of the UK’s membership of the EU combined with 
a significant shift from old to new media as a means of knowledge and debate. Second, 
the political climate and chaos within the Conservative party has led to the UK government 
shifting to the right and endorsing UKIPs far-right political agenda. Third, this changed po-
litical climate endorses the monitoring of foreigners and their children; the reduction of for-
eign students; and the open hated of those who speak up in opposition to this far-right po-
litical agenda. Fourth, as discussed above the use of a referendum, the significant decline 
in the UK’s public sphere, the change of UK government, and the shift to executive and 
bureaucratic rule is emptying democratic parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. Fifth, the 
disuniting of the UK has become an increasingly likely reality, with Scotland and Northern 
Ireland demanding to remain free moving participants in the EU’s Single Market. 
 
(iii) Social Questions 
 
From 1960 to 1984 the UK was one of the more equal societies in Europe, with Gini ine-
quality indices in the range 23 to 27 (compared with Denmark 38 to 28, and USA 38 to 
34).25 With the election of the Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979, in-
equality in the UK climbed rapidly to US levels, with Gini inequality indices in the range 28 
to 35 (compared with Denmark 20 to 28, and USA 34 to 38) in the period 1985 to 2016. As 
discussed above, the referendum demonstrated the deeply divided nature of UK society, 
but it also accelerated some of these divisions through the xenophobic and racist language 
and policies legitimised in the process.26 UK Home Office figures show how a 41% in-
crease in hate crimes took place immediately following the referendum, with central Euro-
peans being specifically targeted.27 This increase in hate crimes was on top of the in-
crease in racism registered since Theresa May’s October 2013 London campaign against 
immigrants titled “Go Home or Face Arrest”.28 Racist incidents and hate crimes had de-
clined in the period 2008-2012, but with the ‘Go Home’ campaign reversed this trend with 
a 5% increase in hate crimes in 2013.29 On top of the gradual rise in racist incidents since 
2013, and the significant increase in hate crimes following the referendum, the Home Of-
                                                 
25
 UN University, WIID: the World Income Inequality Database. 
26
 Evander Pedersen, ‘Professor: Politikerne vildleder arbejderklassen om EU, Kristeligt Dagblad, 30
th
 June 
2016. 
27
 Home Office Official Statistics, Hate crime, England and Wales, 2015 to 2016, 13
th
 October 2016. 
28
 BBC News, ‘Theresa May says 'go home' will not be rolled out across UK’, 22
nd
 October 2013. 
29
 Home Office Official Statistics, Hate crimes, England and Wales, 2013 to 2014, 16
th
 October 2014. 
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fice figures detail the 147% increase in UK homophobic attacks in the three months fol-
lowing the referendum. 
 
Britain’s imperial history and successive UK government policies are responsible for the 
relative difference between immigrants and emigrants in the UK. Britain’s foreign invasion, 
colonisation, and empire explain the increase in the proportion of resident population born 
abroad from 4.3% in 1951 to 8.9% in 2001.30 Evidence from the 1951 to 2011 Census 
demonstrates that the vast majority of foreign-born and naturalised UK residents are the 
result of UK relations with its former colonies: Ireland, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jamai-
ca, Nigeria, South Africa, and the USA.  
 
Since 1984 successive UK governments have promoted the four freedoms of movement of 
people, goods, capital and services in the EC/EU. UK governments have also been at the 
forefront of opening the EU up to membership and subsequent freedom of movement of 
people from new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, against opposition from 
other Western European member states. At the same time, UK governments have been 
opposed to any attempt to introduce common EU rules on immigration and asylum poli-
cies, in particular by staying out of internal border arrangements (Schengen Convention) 
and policies that result from the UK advocacy of free movement of people (Justice and 
Home Affairs cooperation). Thus in 2004 the 10 new member states of the EU faced tran-
sitory restrictions until 2011 in most existing EU member states, except for the UK, Ireland, 
and Sweden. Hence, successive UK governments’ policies resulted in attracting the free-
dom of movement of people from new Central and Eastern European member states such 
as Poland and the Baltic states. 
 
Like the rest of the developed (OECD) world, the UK’s long-term demographic decline is 
dependent on the role played by immigration and emigration, whether for education, em-
ployment, or travel. With predicted proportions of residents over 65 of approximately 20-
30% and over 85 of approximately 5-10%, the UK faces very real challenges of its medi-
um-term economic and social tax, benefits and care.31 Recent migrant workers into the UK 
help address this demographic challenge and are net tax contributors, and they are also 
essential parts of the workforce in the manufacturing industries of the UK. In particular, the 
food, tourist, logistics, building, textiles and clothing, and wholesale trade industries all 
have migrant worker shares of total employment over 20%, with all UK industries averag-
ing approximately 16% migrant workers.32 Migrant workers from the 2004 enlargement of 
                                                 
30
 Office for National Statistics, ‘2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in 
England and Wales in 2011’, 17
th
 December 2013. 
31
 Francesca Colombo, et al., Help Wanted?: Providing and Paying for Long-Term Care, OECD, 2011; Chris-
tine de la Maisonneuve and Joaquim Oliveira Martins, ‘Public spending on health and long-term care: a new 
set of Projections’, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 6, 2013. 
32
 The Migration Observatory, ‘Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview’, Oxford University, 9
th
 No-
vember 2015 
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the EU make up approximately 5% of all UK industries employees, and are particularly ac-
tive in the food, domestic services, accommodation, and logistics industries. 
 
Finally, the social freedoms of people living in Europe have changed massively since the 
1980s – freedom to travel, study, live and work in each other’s countries without significant 
restriction. It has been forgotten just how difficult and expensive it was to travel; how little 
opportunity there was for studying without English as a common language; all the preju-
dice and barriers to moving and living in another country; and the unlikelihood of finding 
work in another European state. At the same time, social rights covering human rights 
and workers’ rights such as gender equality, LGBT rights, paid holiday leave, parental 
leave, equal pay, fair treatment, and limits to the working week have all become law in the 
UK and across Europe because of the EU.33 
 
(iv) Economic Questions 
 
Economic prosperity in Europe has improved dramatically since the 1950s. The living 
standards (UN Human Development Index) of every EU member state have improved sig-
nificantly since the 1950s, in particular those countries with relatively low initial levels in 
Southern and Eastern Europe.34 These rising living standards across the EU include sub-
stantial improvements in income per person, education, and life expectancy. Perhaps the 
UK could have improved its living standards outside the EU, but the history of the UK’s 
relative decline from the end of the First World War until EC membership in 1973 makes 
clear this was not the case. In 1913 the UK’s living standards were ranked 6th in the world 
(behind New Zealand, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada), but by 1950 the 
UK had been passed by the USA, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway to be ranked 10th in 
the world.35 During the 1960s this post-imperial decline continued, ensuring that by 1975 
the UK’s living standards were ranked equal 13th in the world after being caught by France, 
Japan, and Austria. During the same period, the economic decline of the UK was similar – 
between 1950 and 1973 the UK’s growth of national income per person was the slowest of 
any of the major G7 economies (including West Germany, France, and Italy). But since 
joining the EU in 1973, the growth in the UK’s national income per person has been the 
fastest of any of the major economies.36 
 
Economically the question of UK membership costs of the EU (approximately £8 billion 
{bn} per year) is irrelevant. The UK economy is worth approximately £2 000 bn (or 250 
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times the annual EU membership costs). UK trade makes up approximately 60% of the 
Gross National Income, of which trade exports to the EU are worth £229 bn per year (or 30 
times the annual EU membership costs). Foreign Direct Investment stock in the UK from 
the EU is worth approximately £500 bn (or 60 times the annual EU membership costs). 
Current estimates of outstanding commitments by the UK to the EU are estimated at £20 
bn (or 2.5 times the annual EU membership costs). Annual European Investment Bank 
loans to the UK are worth approximately £10 bn per year (just over the annual EU mem-
bership costs). 
 
The political and social divisions within the UK will be greatly exaggerated by the economic 
costs of leaving the EU. All independent research-based economic analyses provide in-
formation on the relative economic costs of leaving the EU, but provide little indication of 
the likelihood of each option occurring. The UK has at least three economic options after 
leaving the EU, but only one is likely in May 2019 – WTO-based trading relations with sig-
nificant and permanent consequences for the UK economy: 
 
European Economic Area membership, similar to Norway, is the first economic option 
but is highly unlikely. The idea that a transitional EEA membership could be negotiated in 
just two years is unlikely (it took existing EFTA members 5 years to negotiate). EEA mem-
bership is likely to be opposed by existing EEA members who do not want their special re-
lationship with the EU shaped by UK commercial interest. Similarly, a transitional EEA 
membership us likely to be opposed by existing EU members who have always seen the 
EEA as a solution for European states wanting closer relations to the EU, not as a resting 
place for a departing EU state. Membership of the EEA would involve membership fees, 
the four freedoms of movement, the implicit jurisdiction of the CJEU and the explicit juris-
diction of the EFTA Court. EEA members have never invoked Article 112 emergency 
measures or declined to legislate EU laws and rules into national legislation for fear of 
damaging the EEA relationship. The static economic costs (not factoring in productivity 
costs) of UK participation in the EEA are in the range of approximately -1% to -2% loss of 
GDP growth spread over a 15 year period following departure from the EU. The dynamic 
economics costs (factoring in productivity costs) of UK participation in the EEA are in the 
range of approximately -3% to -4% loss of GDP spread over the same 15 year period.37 
 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), similar to those of Switzerland, Canada, or even 
Turkey’s Customs Union with the EU is the second economic option but is also unlikely. As 
the Swiss and Canadian models have demonstrated, the mixture of supranational-EU and 
international-member state competences require agreement amongst both EU states and 
member state national and regional legislatures. The Canadian free trade agreement took 
7 years to negotiate and was subject to agreement by 38 legislatures – a model that would 
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make agreement between the EU and the UK unlikely to be agreed inside of a decade. 
The Swiss bilateral model is far more complicated and difficult to maintain, with wide-
spread agreement in the EU prior to the UK referendum that it should not be replicated. 
The Swiss bilateral agreement involves buying into programmes, such as the EU research 
programme, as well as participating in the free movement of people. However, free move-
ment of services are restricted to certain areas, which involve Swiss companies establish-
ing subsidies within the EU. A customs union, such as Turkey’s, primarily applies only to 
free movement of goods, with Turkey applying the common external EU customs rules and 
tariffs, but the movement of goods into and out of the EU is not subject to the customs 
controls and ‘rules of origin’ that EEA and EFTA goods are. The annual static economic 
costs of UK participation in a FTA are in the range of approximately -2% to -3% loss of 
GDP growth spread over a 15 year period following departure from the EU, depending on 
the specifics of the agreement. The dynamic economic costs of UK participation in a FTA 
are in the range of approximately -5% to -8% loss of GDP spread over the same 15 year 
period, depending on the specifics of the agreement. An FTA or customs union might save 
some of the UK’s manufacturing industries, but are unlikely to save most of the UK’s ser-
vices industries (which make up 80% of the UK economy, GDP 2016).38 
 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership provides the most likely outcome in the 
medium term, as both EEA and FTA prove difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. UK tariffs 
with trading partners would be subject to WTO rules on the basis of ‘Most Favour Nation’ 
levels, unless FTAs or existing agreements remain in place, which is unlikely. The UK 
would also have to renegotiate its membership of the WTO as it joined in 1995 as part of 
the special status granted to the EU as a Regional Trade Agreement. Falling back on 
WTO membership would have a critical impact with EU’s Common External Tariff, cus-
toms barriers, Non-Tariff Barriers, and regulatory barriers being enforced on the UK. The 
annual static economic costs of UK trade on a WTO basis are in the range of approximate-
ly -3% to -4% loss of GDP growth spread over a 15 year period following departure from 
the EU. The dynamic economic costs of UK trade on a WTO basis are in the range of ap-
proximately -5% to -10% loss of GDP spread over the same 15 year period. In the ab-
sence of an FTA, it is predicted by Leave supporters such as the discredited neoliberal 
Patrick Minford, that UK agriculture and manufacturing would soon be eliminated.39 
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The Leave campaign emphasised Britain fulfilling the neoliberal dream of becoming a fully-
privatised, free-market state, similar to Singapore or Hong Kong.40 These idealised views 
are highly misleading, firstly because there are no examples of developed countries ever 
having succeeded economically in this way – for example Singapore is a state-owned 
economy with 90% of land, 85% of housing, and 22% of GDP owned by the government. 
Secondly, the necessity of free trading with any and all economies in the world will make 
the UK more vulnerable to the influence of larger economies such as China or the USA, 
who will inevitably demand Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) to the detriment of 
UK sovereignty and possibility security. Theresa May’s agreement to the highly problemat-
ic Hinkley Point C nuclear power station indicates that such processes have already be-
gun. Thirdly, it is not realistic to expect that the UK will succeed in agreeing beneficial bi-
lateral trade agreements with emerging economies such as China, India, or Brazil. It is 
unlikely that any agreements will be reached without substantial compromises from the UK 
(for example, over foreign ownership and strategic assets, as well as easing visa controls 
for foreign nationals).41 Similarly, even if compromising agreements are reached (such as 
the Switzerland-China FTA), in the medium term they could not compensate for the loss of 
EU markets, while in the long term the economic growth predictions of the world’s largest 
emerging economies are flattening to levels comparable to post-war Europe – India (7%), 
China (5%) and Brazil (3%) after 2020.42 Finally, any such bilateral free trade agreements 
are primarily important for trade in goods, which places the UK at a disadvantage, while 
trade in services are rarely covered to the considerable disadvantage of the UK economy. 
 
(v) Conflict Questions 
 
Peace in Europe has been only guaranteed by addressing the roots of conflict – the long-
lasting mistrust and hatreds built-up between the peoples of Europe. Prior to the process 
of European integration in the 1950s, it is almost impossible to find a decade of peace be-
tween current EU member states going back centuries.  Clearly, peace among the Euro-
pean warring nations since 1950 has not been achieved by the EU alone as the presence 
of the USA/NATO, and the fear of the Soviet Union were important. But NATO defends 
European members from external aggression, it does not prevent conflict amongst Euro-
pean states – as the 1974-2004 conflict between NATO members Greece and Turkey over 
Cyprus illustrates. The military interests of the USA have swung towards East Asia, leav-
ing Europeans to deal with Russia.  
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The UK has been heavily involved in conflicts with European states prior to joining the EU, 
most of which have been forgotten. The long-lasting dispute with Spain over Gibraltar, re-
ignited in the 1960s, will inevitably flair up again, as will conflicts over fishing rights that 
were addressed by Spanish EU membership in 1986. Similarly, it is forgotten how often 
the cross-channel ports of Dover, Folkestone, Newhaven, Ramsgate, Calais, Dieppe, Bou-
logne, and Dunkirk were blockaded by British and French protesters over commercial is-
sues such as transport, agriculture or fishing prior to the Single Market. In addition, conflict 
between the UK and France over migration control, for example in Calais, will be inevita-
ble. Fishing wars between the UK and Iceland, Faroes, Ireland, Norway, France or Spain 
are also far more likely after the UK leaves the Common Fisheries Policy. 
 
The biggest conflict question is over the status of Northern Ireland which, after the 1969-
1997 ‘Troubles’, was resolved within the context of equal Irish and UK membership of the 
EU. The departure of the UK from the EU will introduce the greatest strains in Northern Ire-
land since both states joined the EU together in 1973. The likelihood is that UK will leave 
not only the border-free Single Market, but also the Irish-UK Common Travel Area (estab-
lished 1923) unless the UK is able to negotiate membership of the EEA before departure 
in May 2019. This will inevitably heighten the risk of conflict over the status of Northern Ire-
land, as well as significantly impact on the Irish economy. One possible outcome is that 
UK citizens living in Northern Ireland will become Irish/EU citizens over the next 2 years, 
shifting the politics of the region. 
 
(vi) Environmental Questions 
 
Debates over legal, political, social, economic, and conflict questions are central to under-
standing the long-term consequences for the UK over the rest of this century. But they are 
not the most important question. In 2016 the world crossed a threshold, a tipping point, 
from which the planet will not return – the average concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere 
is now at 400 parts-per-million, guaranteeing that mean surface temperatures will rise 
above 2 degrees Celsius and continue to rise. 
 
Prior to joining the EU, Britain was called the ‘dirty man of Europe’ because of its appalling 
pollution and conservation standards. It was perfectly normal to grow up in a coastal town 
where sewage ran down the local beach. The EU has promoted the strongest environmen-
tal protection programmes and laws in the world, trying to lead the massive transfor-
mations needed to cope with climate change. Britain’s beaches are safer, its water clean-
er, and its air more breathable because of EU membership. 
 
Theresa May has stated she is committed to signing the 2015 Paris climate change 
agreement in 2017, but the UK’s departure from the EU raises serious questions. It is inev-
Ian Manners Where does the Brexit debate stand in the UK right now?  
18 
 
itable that the UK leaving the EU will change the grounds of the EU’s 2030 climate change 
Effort-Sharing Decision, the greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme, and hence the 
EU approach to climate change. In terms of alternate energy this shift in UK position has 
been taking place for some time – the UK dropped out of the top 10 of the World Energy 
Council’s Trilemma Index for energy for the first time in 2016.43 The UK government’s sup-
port for nuclear power over sustainable energy, and its support for fracking in Lancashire 
demonstrate its problematic environmental position. This environmental position is likely to 
worsen as UK agriculture declines after departure – pushing the UK into adopting GMO 
agricultural production and foodstuffs. The Leave campaign was committed to removing 
environmental and labour legislation, such as the 2013 Energy Act, the 1996 Employment 
Rights Act, and the 1998 Working Time Regulations. It is inevitable that the neoliberal 
drive for free trade, economic pressure on the government, and the desire to remove envi-
ronmental legislation will all have negative consequences on environmental questions in 
the UK. 
 
 
Where does the Brexit debate stand in the UK right now? 
 
As this brief has made clear, the unconvincing referendum context, the UK government 
omnishambles, and divisive Brexit debates have opened a rupture at the heart of British 
society and politics that will dominate and dissolve the notion of a united kingdom this cen-
tury. The unconvincing referendum context, with a meaningless referendum and indeci-
sively close result primarily explained by structural inequality, leaves UK politics scarred by 
the realisation that there is no one nation called Britain. The subsequent UK government 
omnishambles driven by party politics, incompetent ministers, and a right-wing political 
agenda, significantly reduces the possibility of a good outcome for Britain. The divisive 
Brexit debates that are only just beginning over legal, political, social, economic, conflict, 
and environmental questions will divide and disunite Britain in a way unseen in modern 
British history. It must be recalled that prior to the global financial crisis and Conservative 
government austerity programme, the UK’s membership of the EU was a second-order is-
sue, behind first-order national political, social, and economic issues. The events of 2016 
will be remembered for reversing the poles of UK politics by submersing genuine UK so-
cio-economic challenges of inequality, disadvantage, poverty, and injustice beneath the 
veneer of nationalism and neoliberal ideology. 
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